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MOVE: Philadelphia’s Forgotten
Bombing

Charles Abraham
James Madison University

In a fortified rowhouse in West Philadelphia, a bomb dropped by Philadelphia Police killed
eleven MOVE members, including five children, and burned down sixty-five other houses after a
lengthy standoff between the two groups. MOVE was a cult-like organization which eschewed
technology, medicine and western clothing, where members lived communally, ate raw food, left
garbage on their yards, and proselytized with a loudspeaker, frustrating the residents of Osage
Avenue. The MOVE Bombing or what is called “May 13, 1985” in West Philadelphia, was a
pivotal moment in the mayoral reign of Wilson Goode and was the first time a U.S. city bombed
itself. The bomb dropped on the MOVE rowhouse with only marginal consequences to the city
government because of previous encounters with MOVE and antipathy in the public towards the
MOVE organization resulting in the group falling into obscurity.1

1
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Vincent Leaphart founded the American Christian Movement for Life, later shortened to
MOVE, in 1972 in West Philadelphia and changed his name to John Africa. MOVE was primarily
a black organization, although white people could join as well. As an antisystem, antitechnology
group, its members ate only a diet of raw fruits, vegetables, nuts and eggs, used no technology,
medicine or western clothing, and disposed their garbage in the backyard and used outhouses
instead of conventional toilets. The children of MOVE, who were not allowed to attend school,
were illiterate, and had never eaten cooked food or watched television. These were the first “pure”
members of MOVE: they were raised to never be exposed to the corrupting influences of social
and political institutions. Members protested outside of zoos or pet stores, often leading to arrests
though the police did not believe MOVE was even potentially violent during the early 1970s.2
The other residents of Powelton Village did not have a great opinion of MOVE, which
lived communally in three townhouses in the neighborhood. Powelton Village, located near Drexel
University and the University of Pennsylvania, was a diverse and tolerant community and a haven
for political activists. In 1976, neighbors began complaining about children playing in the yard
without diapers and in unsanitary conditions. Due to Powelton residents’ complaints, the police
set up twenty-four-hour surveillance on the MOVE townhouses. The next year, MOVE members
began to sit out on the porch holding rifles, wearing berets, and using loudspeakers to lecture their
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neighbors. MOVE already held a reputation as a radical black organization, much like the Black
Panthers, because of MOVE’s emergence during the “Black Power” era. Many in Philadelphia
believed that the public display of weapons to be the start of the organization becoming more
militant.3
Tensions between the city and MOVE began to rise as neighbors in Powelton continued
complaining about MOVE’s actions and as the police department’s surveillance of MOVE began
to infuriate them. In the year between 1977 and 1978, MOVE left bomb-timing devices, though
no explosives, in several hotels across the nation as well as in London. These devices were left
with threatening letters stating that MOVE would strike for real unless Philadelphia stopped its
harassment. The organization had begun a feud with the then-Mayor Frank Rizzo, who had
previously served as Philadelphia’s Police Commissioner and ran for mayor on a law-and-order
campaign. MOVE’s residency in Powelton Village came to a head in 1978 after the May 5th
Agreement between MOVE and the city disintegrated. The city and MOVE agreed that the city
would end the blockade and within 90 days MOVE members would relocate to a residence outside
the city. MOVE saw the city as at the heart of the issue, and they stayed past the 90-day limit.
While several organizations active in Powelton Village at the time were either pro-MOVE or
supported negotiation with MOVE to allow them to stay in the neighborhood, MOVE and the
police engaged in a protracted firefight resulting in the death of one policeman, Officer James
Ramp, and the sentencing of nine MOVE members to jail for the officer’s death.4

Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 29-31; Nagel, “Psychological Obstacles to Administrative
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After being forced out of Powelton Village, MOVE took up residence in a townhouse on
Osage Avenue in Cobs Creek, West Philadelphia. At first, MOVE and the residents of Osage
coexisted peacefully. In time, however, tensions began to grow as lifestyle differences emerged
and the neighbors began complaining. MOVE left their garbage outside, collected animals and fed
them food, they would take the neighbor’s pets and remove their flea collars and they built pigeon
coops. Most distressing to Osage Avenue residents was the MOVE children appeared to be
malnourished and rummaged through their trash looking for food. The neighbors were told Wilson
Goode would help them if they would just wait until after he had become mayor, but in late 1983
after the mayoral election, MOVE began to use bullhorns and loudspeakers to harass their
neighbors.5
MOVE believed Mayor Goode had the ability to release the jailed MOVE 9 members, and
they knew if they began to harass residents of Osage Avenue, a middle-class neighborhood and
the bedrock of Goode’s political support, the city would have to do pay attention to them. After he
won the mayoral election, despite MOVE holding the block hostage to obtain the release of fellow
members, Goode used a policy of avoidance, appeasement, and non-confrontation towards MOVE,
attempting to avoid conflict in any way possible. City Operating Departments—Health, Water,
Human Services, Streets—were barred by city policy from carrying out their responsibilities at the
MOVE rowhouse. City officials believed MOVE would stop its harassment once they realized the
city was ignoring them and would either change their belligerent behavior or leave the city. This
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policy of non-confrontation and avoidance proved ineffective, and in 1984 the Philadelphia Police
began to plan a course of action against MOVE, one of the first signs of what was to come.6
Mayor Goode told the police he needed a plan of action against MOVE in the spring of
1985. He wanted to explore the possibilities of arresting some MOVE members and obtaining a
court order to hold the children. MOVE began fortifying their rowhouse in earnest in the fall of
1984 and the winter of 1985, building a bunker made of railroad ties, logs and steel plates on the
top of their house and they used similar material to fortify the walls. In April 1985 they announced
with bullhorns their intentions to kill the mayor or any police officer who approached the fortified
MOVE house. Neighbors claimed they had seen men with rifles on the roof and in the bunker of
the house and they held a press conference where they threatened to take matters into their own
hands. On the morning of May 13, 1985, the police attempted to serve warrants for the arrests of
four MOVE members. These warrants were for misdemeanor charges and primarily served to get
MOVE out of the neighborhood. Mayor Goode also required that any officers involved in the 1978
shooting not be involved in the operation on Osage, but despite this, several of those officers were
present in the assault force. At 5:30 A.M. outside the MOVE rowhouse, police used a bullhorn to
announce the names of the members to be arrested for illegal possession of explosives and
terroristic threats and gave the members fifteen minutes to surrender. MOVE refused. Police
insertion teams then entered the houses on either side of the rowhouse. In response, MOVE shot
at the police force from inside of the house. Over the next hour and a half, the Philadelphia police
fired over 10,000 rounds of ammunition on the rowhouse and used explosives to blow holes in the
walls. By 10:40 A.M. the front of the house was destroyed, but the fortifications MOVE had
Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 32, 82-85; Nagel, “Psychological Obstacles to Administrative
Responsibility,” 1-23; Assefa, Extremist Groups and Conflict Resolution, 110-111; Persons, “The Philadelphia
MOVE Incident as an Anomaly in Models of Mayoral Leadership,” 249-260.
6
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installed in the winter had held, preventing the police from seizing the house. When it became
clear their tactics had failed, Mayor Goode, during a televised press conference, announced he
would take the house by any means necessary.7
After the press conference, the police began to plan another way to force out the eleven
people in the house, including the use of explosives. They began assembling an explosive entry
device around 4:30 P.M., and around fifteen minutes later, Mayor Goode approved the use of the
entry device. Then, at 5:27 P.M., the police dropped an explosive package from a helicopter onto
the bunker of the MOVE house. When the bomb exploded it did not remove the bunker; rather, it
ignited a gasoline tank. Instead of trying to contain the resulting blaze, the police and fire
commissioners decided to let the bunker burn. It was not until 6:32 P.M. that the fire department
turned on its hoses and it took until 9:30 P.M. for them to take more active steps to contain the
fire. The fire raged on until 11:41 P.M. engulfing 61 homes, damaging 110 houses, killing John
Africa and the ten other occupants of the MOVE house, five of them children, and leaving 250
men, women, and children homeless.8
The bombing of the MOVE rowhouse should have been pivotal event in the history of
Philadelphia, showing the incompetence of city officials in an explosive finale. Yet, after the
bombing, Mayor Goode and the Philadelphia Police Department received an outcry of support
from around the country. The Los Angeles Police Chief at the time, Daryl Gates, defended the use
of an explosive device, declaring it “a sound tactic”. Gates also stated “[Mayor Goode] has
provided some of the finest leadership [he had] ever seen from any politician” and that he hoped
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“[Mayor Goode] ran for national office”. Michael Nutter, then an assistant to a city councilman
said “[MOVE] is a group of people whose philosophy is based on conflict and confrontation”. Roy
Innis, who was the chairman of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), called Mayor Goode’s
handling of the crisis “heroic”. Tom Cremans, the former director of Accuracy Systems Inc which
sells munitions to police departments, said “the police exercised remarkable restraint in not using
the device earlier”. However, the bomb squads of many cities were reluctant to comment on the
incident, not wishing to criticize their fellow officers.9
Despite those speaking in favor of the mayor and the Philadelphia Police Department, not
all law enforcement officers were complimentary of Philadelphia’s handling of the MOVE crisis.
The director of the American Federation of Police, Gerald Arenberg, believed “They broke every
rule in the book” when it came to their handling of the MOVE incident and the bombing. James
Fife, a police lieutenant in New York City, described it by saying, “They burned down the village
to save the village” before continuing, adding that the actions taken by the Philadelphia Police
Department were “really unheard of”. According to Fife and Arenberg, many police departments
have small armored tanks that can be used to batter doors down without endangering the lives of
the officers and Arenberg stated the Philadelphia police “just weren’t using all the equipment
available to any modern police department”. The MOVE bombing captured the attention of the
world, and as many law enforcement agencies weighed in on the actions of the Philadelphia police,
so too did the media, both national and international.10

Ron Wolf, William K. Marimow, Steve Lopez and John Woestendiek, “How the Bomb Decision was Made,”
Philadelphia Inquirer, May 17, 1985; Tom Infield, Doreen Carvajal and Robert J. Terry, “MOVE Letter Threatened
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Radicals’ Home in Philadelphia,” New York Times, May 14, 1985.
10
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9

7

The media took a largely critical view of the MOVE incident and Mayor Goode. Many
newspapers around the world were unsympathetic to the siege of the MOVE rowhouse and called
Philadelphia a “war zone”. Front-pages of many newspapers showed pictures of smoldering
rowhouses in West Philadelphia. The Washington Post referred to the pictures as resembling “wartorn Beirut” and the New York Daily News called the bombing “a terrible, unnecessary, and costly
blunder”. The MOVE bombing attracted national attention with newspapers in France paying
considerable attention to the MOVE incident, the France-Soir had an aerial photo of the
devastation and Liberation, a French tabloid, called the incident “one of the most unbelievable
urban guerrilla operations that America has ever known”. In Moscow, a newscaster reported: “six
dead, 60 houses destroyed, hundreds homeless—such is the sinister result of a bloody slaughter
which was launched by police”. The San Francisco Chronicle was extremely harsh in its criticism,
writing there was “no excuse” for the bombing and it was “an astonishing example of overkill”.
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution was also critical, calling it reckless and including comments
from people such as Burton Caine, the president of the Philadelphia chapter of the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) who called the bombing “totally unjustified” and New York Mayor
Edward Koch who stated that “if [he] had a police commissioner so stupid to allow a bomb to be
thrown into a house, [he] would remove him”. The Dallas Morning News focused on the residents
of the 6200 block of Osage. One resident, Kevin Young, called the bombing “unjustifiable” and
said Osage “is not a battle zone”. Harry Smeck, another resident, said that he was “totally
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disgusted” with the city and how it had handled the crisis. These harsh comments about the
administration and its action were widespread after May 13, 1985 and its actions that day. 11
Despite all these critical reports, some newspapers were more supportive of Philadelphia
and the mayor. The New York Times referred to MOVE as a radical group, focused more on the
complaints from the neighbors against MOVE and framed the incident as a city reacting against
behavior that was well out of the norm for a working-class African-American neighborhood. In
the Times article, Dee Peoples, the owner of a store two blocks away from the MOVE house, said
that “all you hear is aggression. You sleep with it, you wake up with it, you live with it” about
living near MOVE. The San Francisco Chronicle wrote about MOVE’s strange philosophy and
how while it was, in theory, a “philosophy of anti-materialism, pacifism and concern for the
environment,” in practice “its history was replete with violence, obscenity and filth”. The
Chronicle article stated that Donald Glassey testified John Africa “had planned an armed
confrontation with police and had MOVE members make bombs and buy fire arms”. The
Lexington Herald-Leader, like the Times, described MOVE as a radical organization and framed
the siege as MOVE refusing “to leave the house under an eviction order from police”. The Herald
article also discussed the neighbors’ complaints of “assaults, robberies, and a stench at the house”.
The Philadelphia administration’s actions during this crisis were highly criticized and opinion on

Jane Eisner, “Media Blitz West Philadelphia Disaster Makes Front-Page Headlines Around the World,”
Philadelphia Inquirer, May 16, 1985; “Police Overkill,” San Francisco Chronicle, May 15, 1985; “Police Tactics
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15, 1985; “225 Left Homeless By Philadelphia Fire – Uprooted Residents Sorrowful, Angry; Mayor Defends MOVE
Incident,” The Dallas Morning News, May 15, 1985.
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them was highly divided among news sources around the city and the globe, but it was a much
different story among the Philadelphia public.12
Many of the Philadelphian public believed they were receiving biased news reports from
the media. One woman from Valley Forge stated she “believed the mayor did a commendable
job,” and “[the press was] questioning the mayor too much”. Many tourists visiting Philadelphia
in the aftermath of the bombing had a similar reaction: “MOVE? It could have happened
anywhere.” There was no feeling the MOVE incident would negatively affect Philadelphia from
those visiting. One resident of Northeast Philadelphia, Eli Teper, complained the police “used too
little force” and “criminals should be treated as such.” Some, like Steward Beatty, also of Northeast
Philadelphia, thought the bombing was justified and it was “nice to see that somebody can still
make decisions instead of doing nothing,” while a tourist from Mississippi, Felix Kogan, agreed
completely with the actions taken against MOVE, and like him, some in Philadelphia supported
the police actions against MOVE. Steve Harmon, a resident of West Philadelphia, said the
bombing of MOVE was “like Vietnam”. While the media and the police around the country were
divided on the MOVE incident, most people in Philadelphia appeared to see it as a tragedy but
were overall still supportive of the mayor and the city.13
The media discussion about the incident shifted closer to the view of the public: while it
was a tragedy, most blame rested on the shoulders of MOVE. Two days before the bombing,
MOVE sent a letter threatening to set fire to their rowhouse and the neighboring house should the
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police attack. This letter began, “If MOVE go down, not only will everyone in this block go down,
the knee joints of America will break and the body of America will soon fall.” Then the letter
threatened, “Before we let you mutha f-s [sic] make an example of us we will burn this mutha f-in
[sic] house down and burn you all up with us”. The city administration began using the letter to
attempt to paint MOVE as the group that began the fire that burnt down sixty-one houses and killed
eleven people. The Police Commissioner Gregore Sambor stated it was his “personal opinion” that
MOVE “started or assisted” the fire. Commissioner Sambor went on to say he was “convinced that
MOVE people saturated those roofs with gasoline”. Mayor Goode said the letter showed MOVE
was “a group that was bent on absolute destruction, a group that was, in fact, a guerilla group inside
an urban area”. The Mayor also stated that the release of the letter was not meant as evidence that
MOVE started the fire but that the letter “says what it says, in [his] opinion”.14
In lockstep with the theory of MOVE burning down the street, the city began to discuss
how the entry device used was extremely safe and could not have caused the fire. The explosive
device used in the bombing was known as Tovex TR-2, manufactured by the Du Pont Company,
who described Tovex TR-2 as “one of the safest explosives on the market”. Before the decision to
use Tovex as the explosive device on the MOVE house, the Philadelphia Police Department
secretly tested different explosives on lumber structures; however, Tovex TR-2 was not meant for
above ground buildings but was instead developed for underground use primarily in mining. The
media began to use the Du Pont Company’s label of Tovex as an extremely safe explosive to push
the idea the fire was not the fault of the city. Mayor Goode took issue with the word bomb as well,
explaining that “what [he] approved to be used was an entry device, which was to take and
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somehow remove the bunker from the top of the house. There was no intent to destroy the house”.
The city attempted to paint MOVE as the aggressors, thereby framing the actions they had
undertaken as merely providing law and order.15
Shortly after the bombing, and amid calls for an official investigation into the
administration’s actions, Mayor Goode announced his intentions to create a special investigation
into the event. A special commission which had no members of the Goode administration, would
examine the incident. William J. Green, Mayor Goode’s predecessor, said the MOVE Special
Commission “has serious, tough questions to ask [the] administration about how it conducted
itself” and “there are many, many unanswered questions and in some cases contradictions that
cannot and should not and must not…be swept under the rug”. The former mayor also said the city
should release the police intelligence files on MOVE so “everyone in Philadelphia would know
what the premise of [the] decisions were”. Despite Green’s harsh words on the city’s actions,
Robert S. Hurst, the then president of Lodge 5 of the Fraternal Order of Police, said “the ultimate
responsibility of the widespread property destruction remains squarely on the members of this
terrorist organization known as MOVE” and public opinion in Philadelphia supported this idea. In
a poll conducted by Teichner Associates of Philadelphia, 71 percent of respondents believed the
mayor did a good or excellent job dealing with MOVE. Even with the support from the
Philadelphia public, the commission was necessary for answering the questions on the city’s
actions during this incident.16
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The MOVE Special Commission hired several people to conduct their investigation. James
R. Phelan, one of the FBI’s explosive and counterespionage experts before he left the bureau two
years earlier, and Charles King, an expert in the cause and spread of fires, were brought in to
investigate the explosives used in the bombing. The original report on the explosive device
indicated the only explosive used was Tovex TR-2. However, three months after the incident,
Officer William C. Klein, testified he had also included C-4 in the device when he had assembled
it. The commission also hired six other investigators to work underneath the lead investigator, Neil
P. Shanahan. These investigators came from Connecticut, Chicago, Virginia, Maryland, as well as
the Philadelphia area. William H. Brown III, the chairman of the commission, said the “search for
the highest-quality, professional investigators [was] long and wide-ranging”. Brown added these
investigators brought “the skills and expertise essential for the investigation to fulfill its mandate”.
The investigators specialized in anti-terrorist programs, major violent crime, and homicide. As the
inquiry continued, it became very critical of how the city managed the MOVE incident.17
As the MOVE Commission’s hearings occurred, these testimonies began to paint Mayor
Goode in an unflattering light. In his testimony, the mayor portrayed himself as misinformed and
misled by his subordinates; he was as much a victim as a leader. He depicted himself as a leader
who confirmed the decisions others made. This was odd, as Goode’s managing style as both city
manager and mayor was very detail oriented. An assistant to the District Attorney, Bernard L.
Siegel, testified before the grand jury that he had heard “the mayor [say] to the police
commissioner, ‘You are the professional and you need not keep me advised of all the details’”.
When the District Attorney, Ed Rendell, was asked about this statement, he thought it was
Larry Eichel, “MOVE Commission hires Former FBI Explosives Expert,” Philadelphia Inquirer, September 6,
1985; Larry Eichel, “Commission Hires 6 Investigators”, Philadelphia Inquirer, July 19, 1985. Investigators named
in article are Clyde E. Berry, James J. Creaturo, Frank L. Eccles, Albert J. Jordan, Thomas J. Mowrer, and Edward
Scott Jr.
17
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“somewhat unusual for Wilson [Goode]” before adding that the mayor’s “management style has
always been to get involved in all the significant details”. The hearing revealed the mayor’s
attempts to distance himself from the MOVE incident as it was occurring by purposefully asking
to not get all the details. This opened Goode up to considerable criticism, the most significant from
former Mayor William Green, who said Goode was pushing a theory of “reverse Nuremberg”
responsibility, he could not be responsible for the incident because he had only accepted the
recommendations from his subordinates. Charles Bowser, a member of the commission, criticized
Goode in a less direct way, stating “the only person who had the foggiest notion of what was going
to happen when the bomb dropped was a police lieutenant”. While these hearings demonstrated
there was a major issue between MOVE and the other residents of the 6200 block of Osage, they
also showed there had been poor communication and inaccurate or incomplete intelligence on the
organization and incompetent leadership.18
When the MOVE Special Commission reached a decision on the actions of the
administration and the police, their report stated Mayor Goode and his administration displayed
“reckless disregard for life and property” in their actions. The report stated, “dropping a bomb on
an occupied rowhouse was unconscionable and should have been rejected out of hand” and “the
plan to drop the bomb was reckless, ill-conceived, and hastily approved”. Commissioner Gregore
Sambor and Managing Director Leo A. Brooks were declared “grossly negligent” for not calling
off the siege. The report also called the mayor “grossly negligent” in his actions and said he
“clearly risked the lives” of the children who had been killed in the house and this was “unjustified
homicide”. Within the report, the commission condemned the mayor saying he “failed to perform

Larry Eichel, “D.A.: Goode Wanted No Details\Rendell Testifies on MOVE,” Philadelphia Inquirer, October 23,
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his responsibility as the city’s chief executive by not actively participating in the preparation,
review, and oversight of the plan”. Goode “abdicated his responsibilities as a leader when, after
midday, he permitted a clearly failed operation to continue [posing] great risk to life and property”.
Despite believing MOVE to be an “authoritarian, violence-threatening cult,” the report declared
the 10,000 rounds of ammunition fired into the rowhouse had been “excessive and unreasonable”
and “the failure of those responsible for the firing to control or stop such an excessive amount of
force was unconscionable” especially with children inside the building. The commission’s findings
were overwhelmingly negative for Mayor Goode, and though this could have caused him to lose
popularity within the city, that was not the case.19
The MOVE Special Commission’s harsh criticisms of Mayor Goode were labeled as
devastating by allies of the mayor, but the newspaper coverage of the report was largely supportive.
An editorial in the Philadelphia Inquirer, written shortly after the report was released, stated the
author “[disagreed] with those who think Wilson Goode should resign”, and noted Philadelphians
should not just judge the mayor on the MOVE incident, but should instead “judge him on his entire
first term”. Mayor Goode also received a large outcry of support from his church followers after
the report. The Inquirer reported “more than 250 people…gathered to pray for Mayor Goode”,
and the Reverend U. O. Ifill Sr. described the prayer services as “a demonstration of the endemic
support the mayor has in the black community”. Despite the findings of the MOVE Special
Commission, Mayor Goode’s support in the city stayed strong and only grew.20
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Over the next couple of years after the MOVE disaster, Wilson Goode’s reputation began
to recover. In an interview more than a year after the MOVE incident, Goode said that “[he] had
some difficult days and difficult times in [his] administration, but [he had] done a lot of good,
constructive things”. John F. White Jr., a city councilman, said “the administration has
demonstrated far more experience over [the] year”. Goode’s reputation slowly recovered as the
incident faded from memory, overshadowed by more flattering endeavors such as Goode
successfully ending a strike involving 14,000 city employees, which created more confidence in
him and his administration. During this period, the city had a major trash and sanitation issue
which Mayor Goode proposed a trash-to-steam plant to be built in the Philadelphia Navy Yard.
When several police officers were arrested on bribery and corruption charges, Mayor Goode was
able to help restore confidence in the Police Department by implementing a reform package aimed
at restructuring the department. It seemed, in the initial aftermath of the MOVE disaster, that
Goode’s political career was over, but over the following two years he worked tirelessly to repair
his image.21
In 1988, his reputation restored and with the city’s collective goodwill, Goode ran for
reelection against former mayor and police commissioner Frank Rizzo. It was a highly contested
election, with the difference being only a slim margin of 17,176 votes out of 652,307 total votes.
In Rizzo’s concession speech, he warned Mayor Goode that he would “have to deliver or [he is]
going to be right on him”. Despite all the bad publicity that his actions against MOVE had brought
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him, Goode’s rehabilitation of his image helped him beat Rizzo and become mayor for his second
term.22
Thirty years after the MOVE bombing, National Public Radio looked back at MOVE and
learned that, despite the amount of media coverage it had at the time, many younger Philadelphians
never even knew it had occurred. Tasneema Raja, an editor on an NPR show who grew up only
twenty minutes north of Philadelphia never learned about MOVE in class, only learning about it
from her father. Gene Demby, also from NPR, who grew up in South Philadelphia in the 1980s
never discussed MOVE in class. Robin Wagner-Pacifici, who studies fringe radical groups at the
New School, believes that other radical groups never identified with MOVE’s antitechnology, proanimal rights, and quasi-Rastafarian beliefs leading the group to be forgotten when discussing
these radical groups. These groups, such as the Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas and the Weaver
family in Ruby Ridge, Idaho had beliefs which overlapped and mentioned each other in their
manifestos, but “none of them mentioned MOVE”. Unlike the Branch Davidians who faced off
against the Department of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, or the Weaver Family who were sieged
by the FBI, the Philadelphia police department bombed MOVE. This was not a showdown between
a fringe radical group and the federal government, but with the local government. A lack of
connection between the general public and MOVE's core beliefs, as well as the city's general
ambivalence toward the group, have caused the MOVE bombing to fade into obscurity.23
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Goode’s victory over Rizzo for a second term as mayor was the first sign that the MOVE
incident held minimal lasting significance to the city outside of Osage Avenue. The second sign
was that schools in Philadelphia do not teach about MOVE, children living in Philadelphia do not
learn about a major event in the history of the city. An event where the mayor bombs their own
city, destroying sixty-one houses and killing eleven people, five being children. The MOVE
bombing should have ended Wilson Goode’s political career, as well as the careers of the others
involved in the decision making that led to the siege of the MOVE rowhouse and subsequent
bombing of its bunker. This should have been an event woven into the very fabric of the city,
instead it was forgotten—the perpetrators allowed to stay in office and to repair their image, their
victims faded into obscurity.
The MOVE bombing is an enormous black spot in the history of Philadelphia, and yet its
occurrence is rarely, if ever, mentioned. That the bombing held no lasting impact in the psyche of
Philadelphia is an affront to the deaths of those eleven MOVE members. While something needed
to be done about MOVE, bombing their rowhouse was too far. Despite two grand juries on the
bombing, no one from the city administration ever faced any consequences resulting from their
part in burning down sixty-one houses and killing eleven people. That there has been no major
lasting effect on the city of Philadelphia as a result of the MOVE bombing is a disgrace and a
disservice to those whose homes burned in the blaze and those who perished as a result of the
city’s actions.
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